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I. INTRODUCTION 
I have had the privilege of talking sovereign bankruptcy 
with David Skeel for the past decade. One of the first articles I 
ever published was part-concurrence, part-debate with David 
Skeel and his coauthor, Patrick Bolton, about priority structures 
for sovereign debt.1 Although we all favored priorities, we differed 
on the content of the optimal priority scheme and ways to achieve 
it.2 Bolton and Skeel advocated a uniform treaty-based scheme,3 
and I a debtor-chosen contractual one.4 In retrospect, our areas of 
agreement were much more important than the daylight between 
us: rather than join the policy establishment in pursuit of the 
holdout creditor, we looked to the legal structures for sovereign 
debt management, and found them wanting.5 I am grateful for 
the opportunity to continue the conversation here. 
It is fair to say that since those early days, I have been a 
sovereign bankruptcy skeptic. Summarized harshly, I have said 
that bankruptcy for sovereigns was either pointless or 
meaningless, and in either case, would never happen.6 After 
leaving the government for teaching, I learned that the last 
argumentit would never happenwas beside the point. If I 
wanted to be a policy pragmatist, I should have stayed behind. 
Our job here is to challenge imaginations until reality catches 
up. 
On the other hand, the pointlessmeaningless conundrum 
requires elaboration. My concern is with sovereign bankruptcy 
proposals that either solve nonexistent problems or purport to 
be all things to all people. I have argued elsewhere that the 
pointlessness problem comes from lifting the institutional 
features of one or another chapter in the U.S. Bankruptcy 
Codedesigned to overcome real obstacles in the U.S. cultural, 
political, legal, and market contextand grafting them onto 
sovereign debt markets, where the obstacles may not exist and 
the solutions would not help.7 Countries have debt problems; 
                                            
 1. See Anna Gelpern, Building a Better Seating Chart for Sovereign 
Restructurings, 53 EMORY L.J. 1115, 1120, 114041, 114445 (2004) (discussing Patrick 
Bolton & David A. Skeel, Jr., Inside the Black Box: How Should a Sovereign Bankruptcy 
Framework Be Structured?, 53 EMORY L.J. 763 (2004)). 
 2. Id. at 114550; Bolton & Skeel, supra note 1, at 767, 78893. 
 3. Bolton & Skeel, supra note 1, at 818. 
 4. Gelpern, supra note 1, at 1118. 
 5. See Bolton & Skeel, supra note 1, at 82122; Gelpern, supra note 1, at 1118, 
113839. 
 6. See Anna Gelpern, Bankruptcy, Backwards: The Problem of Quasi-Sovereign 
Debt, 121 YALE L.J. 888, 890, 941 (2012). 
 7. See Gelpern, supra note 1, at 112223. 
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they do not have the debt restructuring problems of U.S. firms, 
towns, or individuals.8 
Meaninglessness comes in response to accusations of 
pointlessness. Confronted with evidence that holdout lawsuits 
have not disrupted sovereign restructurings, that sovereign 
immunity has been a serviceable shield from creditors, and that 
facilitating creditor coordination has not stopped bailouts,9 
proponents might shift from an institutionally specific version of 
bankruptcy to one that is all-encompassing.10 They evoke 
something like Elizabeth Warrens capacious vision of 
bankruptcy as an attempt to reckon with a debtors multiple 
defaults and to distribute the consequences among a number of 
different actors on the basis of a number of competingand 
sometimes conflictingvalues in this distribution.11 
Warren was ascribing purpose to an existing regime in a 
particular setting.12 She could afford to be general and poetic 
because she was not designing from scratch, but rather fighting 
for the soul of an operating system. Sovereign bankruptcy 
advocates do not have this luxury. A credible proposal must 
diagnose the most pressing sovereign debt problems it would 
solve, offer tools to solve such problems, and explain how these 
tools improve on the status quo. 
Given my record of skepticism, it might come as a surprise 
that this Commentary is an attempt not only to support the 
general idea of statutory sovereign bankruptcy, but also to 
imagine some of the features it should have. I engage in this 
thought experiment for two reasons. First, despite my 
reservations about transplanting bankruptcy for sovereigns, I 
like and respect many of the people who propose it, and want to 
try my best to agree with them. Second, recent debt restructuring 
experience in Europe and Latin America convinced me that the 
                                            
 8. See id. 
 9. See generally Ran Bi, Marcos Chamon & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, The Problem that 
Wasnt: Coordination Failures in Sovereign Debt Restructurings (Intl Monetary Fund, 
Working Paper No. 11/265, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1974833; Udaibir S. Das, Michael G. Papaioannou & Christoph 
Trebesch, Sovereign Debt Restructurings 19502010: Literature Survey, Data, and 
Stylized Facts 2829, 50 (Intl Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 12/203, 2012), 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12203.pdf (providing an 
overview of modern restructuring experience). 
 10. Kenneth Rogoff & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Early Ideas on Sovereign Bankruptcy 
Reorganization: A Survey 5 (Intl Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 02/57, 2002), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=879533 (discussing how a 
comprehensive response could remedy a lack of coordination between classes of creditors). 
 11. See Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 777 (1987). 
 12. See id. at 77677. 
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existing system for restructuring sovereign debt is deeply 
dysfunctional and produces bad law. As before, I do not care 
whether the outcome of my experiment is called bankruptcy. 
But if it makes me a fellow traveler, I would be honored. 
With this goal in mind, my Commentary proceeds as follows. 
First, I lay out the dominant arguments for sovereign bankruptcy 
and why I think they miss the mark.13 Second, I identify what 
are, in my view, the key problems with the prevailing regime for 
sovereign debt restructuring.14 These include the unenforceable-
yet-nondischargeable character of sovereign debt, fragmentation 
of the debt stock and of the debt restructuring process, and the 
overall lack of transparency and legitimacy in debt restructuring. 
Until now, sovereign immunity has been just barely good enough 
to preempt demand for a more elaborate institutional 
restructuring mechanism.15 However, recent developments in 
Argentina and Greece highlight the shortcomings of sovereignty 
as a restructuring regime.16 With or without immunity, 
sovereigns get no fresh start.17 The lack of legitimacy in sovereign 
restructuring is especially troublesome when it brings about 
large-scale redistribution within and across societies, and even 
across generations.18 Having identified the problems, I proceed to 
sketch out core features of an institutional response. 
I conclude by adding a federalism overlay to my thought 
experiment. Fiscal federalism can exacerbate some of the 
problems with sovereign debt restructuring that I identified 
earlier. Formally embedding a debt restructuring mechanism in 
a federal bargain can help mitigate these problems. However, it 
would also require unprecedented political consensus.19 I suggest 
                                            
 13. See infra Part II. 
 14. See infra Part III. 
 15. See Jonathan I. Blackman & Rahul Mukhi, The Evolution of Modern Sovereign 
Debt Litigation: Vultures, Alter Egos, and Other Legal Fauna, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
Fall 2010, at 47, 4849 (explaining how foreign sovereign immunity rules function as a 
rough proxy for insolvency laws). 
 16. See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 25761 (2d Cir. 2012); 
Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Christoph Trebesch & Mitu Gulati, The Greek Debt Exchange: An 
Autopsy 3 (Sept. 11, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2144932. 
 17. See Anna Gelpern, Odious, Not Debt, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2007, 
at 100 (discussing the impossibility of a fresh start despite successive debt relief 
initiatives for poor countries). 
 18. See Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Responsible Sovereign Lending and 
Borrowing, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Fall 2010, at 63, 6970 (explaining the 
intergenerational tensions created by sovereign borrowing). 
 19. David A. Skeel, Jr., States of Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 677, 71517 (2012) 
(identifying the lack of political will as an impediment to implementing sovereign 
bankruptcy). 
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that Europe could achieve such a consensus as part of its broader 
renegotiation of the federal arrangement. 
II. WHY BANKRUPTCY? 
The affirmative case for sovereign bankruptcy is assumed 
surprisingly often from the fact that governments have too much 
debt or the wrong sort of debt.20 The debate then moves 
immediately to discrediting objections to bankruptcy, many of 
which are weak indeed.21 In this Part, I try to tease out the 
prevailing affirmative case, and suggest why I think most of the 
arguments in favor of bankruptcy are not entirely convincing. 
A. Too Much Debt, Wrong Sort of Debt 
The three biggest substantive arguments for bankruptcy are 
really arguments for debt relief. I have discussed them at length 
before;22 what follows is a brief overview. First, bankruptcy is 
proposed as a solution to debt overhangwhich, for sovereigns, 
means a level of indebtedness that dissuades future investment 
and distorts a countrys incentives by diverting to the creditors 
any returns on painful policy reforms.23 This is an efficiency 
argument popular with economists and dominant among the 
policy set.24 It keys off a particular debt threshold; the precise 
formula for finding the threshold is heavily contested.25 
A distinct but related argument, usually advanced by 
religious and civil society groups, is that excess debt takes away 
a countrys autonomy.26 The threshold of overindebtedness need 
                                            
 20. See id. at 689; see also REBECCA M. NELSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41838, 
SOVEREIGN DEBT IN ADVANCED ECONOMIES: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 7 
(2013). 
 21. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Is Bankruptcy the Answer for Troubled Cities and 
States?, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 1063, 106680 (2013); Skeel, supra note 19, at 70726; Kunibert 
Raffer, Let Countries Go Bankrupt: The Case for Fair and Transparent Debt Arbitration, 4 
INTERNATIONALE POLITIK UND GESELLSCHAFT [J. INTL REL. & GLOBAL TRENDS] 367, 368
71 (2001) (Ger.). 
 22. Gelpern, supra note 6, at 92530. 
 23. See Jeffrey Sachs, The Debt Overhang of Developing Countries, in DEBT, 
STABILIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT 80 (Guillermo Calvo et al. eds., 1989); Paul Krugman, 
Financing vs. Forgiving a Debt Overhang, 29 J. DEV. ECON. 253, 254 (1988). 
 24. See Sachs, supra note 23, at 8998. 
 25. Das, Papaioannou, & Trebesch, supra note 9, at 75; Debt Sustainability 
Analysis, INTL MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/dsa/index.htm (last 
updated Mar. 15, 2012). 
 26. See JUBILEE DEBT CAMPAIGN, DEBT AND PUBLIC SERVICES 2 (2007), available at 
http://www.jubileedebtcampaign.org.uk/Debt3720and3720Public3720Services+3704.twl; 
Pope John Paul II, Address at Saint Peters Basilica: Incarnationis Mysterium Bull of 
Indiction of the Great Jubilee of the Year 2000 (Nov. 29, 1998), 
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not be the same as in the overhang argument, nor is the 
threshold calculated with mathematical precision. Rather, the 
task is to find the point at which a government becomes 
effectively beholden to its creditors. As with overhang, the 
threshold might be different for different countries depending on 
factors such as resource endowment, domestic politics, and policy 
capacity.27 
The third overarching argument for sovereign bankruptcy
Odious Debtalso originates most often with civil society groups. 
It has gained broad currency in the wake of regime change in 
Iraq, and Ecuadors debt repudiation.28 The basis for debt relief in 
the Odious Debt argument is the illegitimate provenance of the 
debt, not its excessive level.29 
In all three cases, the problem is debt. In the first two, the 
solution is to reduce the debt to a level consistent with efficiency 
and autonomy, respectively. In the third, it is to eliminate 
illegitimate debt. Such solutions can be achieved through 
unilateral default or debt forgiveness, selective repudiation, ad 
hoc renegotiation, third-party transfers (bailouts in the 
pejorative), or bankruptcy.30 All but bankruptcy are staples in 
                                            
http://www.vatican.va/jubilee_2000/docs/documents/hf_jp-ii_doc_30111998_bolla-
jubilee_en.html. Compare this argument with the rationale for personal bankruptcy in 
Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 
1393 (1985), observing that individuals can obtain a discharge from their debts, which 
allows the debtor a financial fresh start. 
 27. See Das, Papaioannou & Trebesch, supra note 9, at 6971. 
 28. See Noteholder Circular from the Republic of Ecuador to the Bondholders 
of the 2012 and 2030 Bonds iiiiv, 1618 (Apr. 20, 2009), available at 
http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/files/2009/04/noteholder-circular-goe-bond-offer.pdf; 
see also A. Mechele Dickerson, Insolvency Principles and the Odious Debt Doctrine: The 
Missing Link in the Debate, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2007, at 53, 60, 6768; 
Seema Jayachandran & Michael Kremer, Odious Debt, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 82, 8283 
(2006). 
 29. Jayachandran & Kremer, supra note 28, at 8283, 87 (containing a leading 
economic account of odious debt, and proposing financial sanctions as a policy response). 
See generally Symposium, Odious Debt: Exploring the Outer Limits of Sovereign Debt 
Relief, 32 N.C. J. INTL L. & COM. REG. 605 (2007) (collections of legal scholarship 
responding to the revival of odious debt doctrines after the fall of Saddam Hussein); 
Symposium, Odious Debts and State Corruption, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2007, 
at 1; Symposium, Odious Debts and State Corruption, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 
2007, at 1. The modern revival of the odious debt theory draws on A.N. SACK, LES 
EFFETS DES TRANSFORMATIONS DES ÉTATS SUR LEURS DETTES PUBLIQUES ET AUTRES 
OBLIGATIONS FINANCIÈRES [THE EFFECTS OF STATE TRANSFORMATIONS ON THEIR PUBLIC 
DEBTS AND OTHER FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS] (1927), quoted in, e.g., PATRICIA ADAMS, 
ODIOUS DEBTS 16466 (1991). See Sarah Ludington & Mitu Gulati, A Convenient 
Untruth: Fact and Fantasy in the Doctrine of Odious Debts, 48 VA. J. INTL. L. 595 (2008), 
for more on the origins of the theory. 
 30. See Gelpern, supra note 6, at 927, 93031. 
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sovereign practice.31 Since 1990, dozens of countries have 
rescheduled, reduced, and eliminated hundreds of billions of 
dollars in debt.32 Several middle-income countries have reduced 
their debts by over 70%; some of the worlds poorest countries 
have eliminated nearly all their debts.33 
Put differently, bankruptcy is not the obvious answer to the 
debt problems of sovereignsworse, it seems to be a uniquely 
disfavored answer. The most urgent task for bankruptcy 
proponents, then, is not to dispel reflexive warnings of bond 
market panic from contract modification. It is to explain how 
bankruptcy might be superior to the well-worn alternative paths 
to debt relief, so much so as to justify diverting considerable 
political and economic resources to establish a new institutional 
framework. I devote the remainder of this Part to the most 
prominent explanations in this vein. 
B. Coordination Problems 
Private creditor coordination problems are by far the leading 
justification for sovereign bankruptcy in the policy mainstream.34 
The narrative holds that between the 1980s and the 1990s, 
sovereign debt transformed from loans to bonds; that loans were 
easy to restructure because they were held by a small number of 
regulated, relationship-driven commercial banks; and that bonds 
were hard to restructure because they were held by hordes of 
wild bondholders, who were not nearly as civic-minded as the 
                                            
 31. See id. at 93641; Ugo Panizza, Federico Sturzenegger & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 
The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt and Default, 47 J. ECON. LITERATURE 651, 
65556, 671 (2009). 
 32. See LEX RIEFFEL, RESTRUCTURING SOVEREIGN DEBT: THE CASE FOR AD HOC 
MACHINERY 17075 (2003); Panizza, Sturzenegger & Zettelmeyer, supra note 31, at 671; 
Das, Papaioannou & Trebesch, supra note 9, at 3033. See generally FEDERICO 
STURZENEGGER & JEROMIN ZETTELMEYER, DEBT DEFAULTS AND LESSONS FROM A DECADE 
OF CRISES (2006). 
 33. INTL MONETARY FUND, FACT SHEET: DEBT RELIEF UNDER THE HEAVILY 
INDEBTED POOR COUNTRIES (HIPC) INITIATIVE 14 (2013), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/pdf/hipc.pdf; INTL MONETARY FUND, FACT 
SHEET: THE MULTILATERAL DEBT RELIEF INITIATIVE 1, 3 (2012) [hereinafter 
MULTILATERAL DEBT RELIEF INITIATIVE], available at http://www.imf.org/ 
external/np/exr/facts/pdf/mdri.pdf; see also Frequently Asked Questions About Debt Relief, 
WORLD BANK, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTSITETOOLS/ 
0,,contentMDK:20147607~menuPK:344191~pagePK:98400~piPK:98424~theSitePK:9547
4,00.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2012) (describing the 2006 agreement of the IMF, the 
World Bank, and the African Development Bank to forgive 100% of a qualifying countrys 
outstanding debt upon that countrys completion of certain policy reforms). Although the 
HIPC and MDRI programs provide for full debt relief, in practice, they have not kept pace 
with advocates expectations. 
 34. See Bolton & Skeel, supra note 1, at 78081; Sean Hagan, Designing a Legal 
Framework to Restructure Sovereign Debt, 36 GEO. J. INTL L. 299, 30810 (2005). 
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banks.35 Whereas banks waited and restructured, bondholders 
would rush to sue and strip assets.36 
This narrative was always stylized: some countries like 
Mexico had hundreds of unruly bank creditors in the 1980s,37 
while others like Pakistan had a small handful of reasonably 
persuadable bondholders in the 1990s.38 Anecdotal evidence of 
relatively brisk and uneventful bond restructuring in the late 
1990s and early 2000s seemed to dispel predictions of another 
lost decadethe time it took to get sovereign loans off the 
books of undercapitalized banks in the United States and 
Europe.39 Recent empirical studies confirm that, contrary to 
predictions, holdouts have not held up many sovereign bond 
restructurings, and that litigation has not been a widespread 
problem either.40 
Commentators have attributed this record of success to 
contractual tools and transactional tactics.41 Majority voting, 
aggregation across the debt stock, minimum participation, and 
exit consents have all played important parts in the story;42 
however, the residual power of sovereign immunity remains a 
disincentive to hold out and especially to sue.43 The fact that until 
now, sovereign debt has been essentially unenforceable thanks to 
immunity, clearly affects the bargaining between a distressed 
sovereign and its creditors, and may even help determine the 
                                            
 35. Hagan, supra note 34, at 30810; see also Gelpern, supra note 6, at 90304. 
 36. See, e.g., Anne Krueger, First Deputy Managing Dir., Intl Monetary Fund, 
International Financial Architecture for 2002: A New Approach to Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring, Address at the National Economists Club Annual Members Dinner (Nov. 
26, 2001) [hereinafter Krueger, International Financial Architecture for 2002], 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2001/112601.htm; Anne Krueger, First Deputy 
Managing Dir., Intl Monetary Fund, New Approaches to Sovereign Debt Restructuring: 
An Update on Our Thinking, Address at the Institute for International Economics 
Conference on Sovereign Debt Workouts: Hopes and Hazards (Apr. 1, 2002) [hereinafter 
Krueger, New Approaches to Sovereign Debt Restructuring], http://www.imf.org/ 
external/np/speeches/2002/040102.htm; Hagan, supra note 34, at 30810. 
 37. See JOSEPH KRAFT, THE MEXICAN RESCUE 1727, 4647 (1984). 
 38. See STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 32, at 14044. 
 39. See generally id. at 83230; Das, Papaioannou & Trebesch, supra note 9.  
 40. Panizza, Sturzenegger & Zettelmeyer, supra note 31, at 67173; Bi, Chamon & 
Zettelmeyer, supra note 9, at 3, 57; Julian Schumacher, Christoph Trebesch & Henrik 
Enderlein, Sovereign Defaults in Court: The Rise of Creditor Litigation 19762010, at 2
3, 20 (Dec. 16, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2189997. 
 41. Bi, Chamon & Zettelmeyer, supra note 9, at 78. 
 42. See Bolton & Skeel, supra note 1, at 765, 77274; Panizza, Sturzenegger & 
Zettelmeyer, supra note 31, at 673. 
 43. See W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Sovereign Immunity and Sovereign Debt 2831 
(UNC, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2180228, 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2180228. 
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outcome.44 Evidence that litigation did not skyrocket as the debt 
stock morphed from loans to bonds and bond defaults started 
happening45 bolsters the immunity hypothesis. 
In sum, whatever the reason, so far there is little evidence 
that private creditor coordination problems delay or disrupt 
sovereign debt restructurings, nor that a new solution is 
necessary. 
C. Delay and Taboo 
Governments, much like people and firms, are incorrigible 
procrastinators when it comes to acknowledging and dealing with 
debt problems.46 Anecdotal evidence suggests that sovereign 
debtors tend to initiate restructuring later than the academic 
and policy opinion says they should.47 Firms, people, and states 
all struggle with the intractable line between illiquidity and 
insolvency;48 everyone will claim temporary illiquidity until long 
past the point of credibility. But sovereigns have unique 
additional incentives to delay. First, the spillover effects of public 
debt default or restructuring on the domestic economy have no 
analogue in private debt.49 Currency collapse and bank runs are 
to be expected when the defaulting government issues its own 
currency and when government debt is the dominant asset in 
domestic banks.50 Trade disruptions and macroeconomic 
                                            
 44. See Panizza, Sturzenegger & Zettelmeyer, supra note 31, at 65354. 
 45. Schumacher, Trebesch & Enderlein, supra note 40, at 23. Although the authors 
find that the number of lawsuits filed against countries has risen since the 1980s, they 
observe that litigation remains rare, and is correlated with the magnitude of creditor 
losses (haircuts) rather than the existence of a liquid secondary market in the countrys 
debt. 
 46. See, e.g., Lee C. Buchheit, Six Lessons From Prior Sovereign Debt 
Restructurings, Paper Prepared for Resolving the European Debt Crisis, a Conference 
Hosted by the Peterson Institute for International Economics and Bruegel 2, 4 (Sept. 13
14, 2011), available at http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/buchheit20110913.pdf; 
Christoph Trebesch, Delays in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, at pt. 3.3 (Oct. 2010) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at https://sites.google.com/site/christophtrebesch/ 
research. 
 47. See, e.g., Zettelmeyer, Trebesch & Gulati, supra note 16, at 49; see also MICHAEL 
MUSSA, ARGENTINA AND THE FUND: FROM TRIUMPH TO TRAGEDY 4 (2002) (criticizing IMF 
disbursements that helped Argentina delay the inevitable debt default by six months, 
followed by restructuring nearly five years later). 
 48. See CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: 
EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 5960 (2009) (describing the liquiditysolvency 
distinction in sovereign debt); Anna Gelpern, Financial Crisis Containment, 41 CONN. L. 
REV. 1051, 107778 (2009) (discussing manipulation of the liquiditysolvency distinction 
in financial crisis). 
 49. See REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 48, at 7377; Panizza, Sturzenegger & 
Zettelmeyer, supra note 31, at 65253. 
 50. Floyd Norris, Escape Route for Greece, with Perils, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2011, at B1. 
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contraction will likely follow suit.51 Second, elected leaders have 
no incentive to preside over an unraveling and every incentive to 
gamble for resurrection.52 Default becomes politically attractive 
only when other cards have been played, and the national psyche 
has had a chance to adjust to the prospect of national failure.53 
Third, the promise of third-party rescuea bailout option held by 
some combination of regional partners, rich country 
governments, and international institutions; and exercised in the 
interests of the guarantor or the systemhelps keep the game 
going past viability, often with the result that a country incurs 
more debt from the rescue and later defaults anyway. The bailout 
option is an underemphasized cause of delay and uncertainty. 
Here bankruptcy faces the same challenge as default or 
restructuring. If sovereigns try to avoid restructuring at all 
costs,54 what would make bankruptcy filing more attractive 
earlier? For individuals and firms, bankruptcy offers, among 
other things, a shield from enforcement and a means to overcome 
collective action problems.55 Even so, personal and corporate 
filings do not reveal a pattern of early diagnosis and cure.56 
Sovereigns already have immunity to shield them from 
enforcement and a mix of immunity and transactional tools to 
overcome collective action problems.57 For bankruptcy to improve 
on the sovereign status quo, it must have a way to deal with the 
spillover effects of default, the time-inconsistency of politicians, 
and the bailout option in the official sectoror at least some 
subset of the three. Otherwise, it is hard to see how bankruptcy 
would overcome countries reluctance to face up to their debt 
problems any better than the options now on the table. 
                                            
 51. REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 48, at 5758. 
 52. See Bolton & Skeel, supra note 1, at 77071; Hagan, supra note 34, at 306. In 
this respect, they may not be that different from corporate leadersbut their time 
horizons are different, and their tenure in office is determined differently. See Bolton & 
Skeel, supra note 1, at 77071. 
 53. See Gelpern, supra note 48, at 106062; Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 
99 GEO. L.J. 435, 449 (2011). 
 54. See Hagan, supra note 34, at 31617; see also Bettina Nunner-Krautgasser, The 
Importance of Being PreparedA Call for a European Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Mechanism 1 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Houston Law Review). 
 55. Bolton & Skeel, supra note 1, at 78081. 
 56. See generally Michelle J. White, Why Dont More Households File for 
Bankruptcy?, 14 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205, 206 (1998) (finding that at least fifteen percent of 
households would benefit from filing for bankruptcy, compared to the approximately one 
percent bankruptcy filing rate); Satyajit Chatterjee, An Equilibrium Model of the Timing 
of Bankruptcy Filings 12, 4 (June 15, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://laef.ucsb.edu/pages/conferences/cdab10/papers/chatterjee.pdf (noting that debtors 
usually wait before filing for bankruptcy after default). 
 57. Bolton & Skeel, supra note 1, at 78081; Gelpern, supra note 6, at 898902. 
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D. Chaos Theories 
Yet another argument comes from those who see bankruptcy 
as rules and a roadmap. They say that todays sovereign 
restructuring practice is a hopeless muddle and, crucially, that 
this uncertainty about rules is delaying fair and efficient debt 
adjustment.58 This argument is suspect because the modern 
sovereign debt restructuring process has been quite predictable 
for decades. It has evolved slowly since the early 1980s, 
responding to shocks from periodic crises, through continuous 
bargaining in a tight circle of influential policy makers, market 
participants, and lawyers.59 
When a country decides to ask for relief, it generally secures 
an economic reform and interim financing program from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), which specifies the 
financing gap during the program period (usually three years) 
and a projected path to debt sustainability.60 The debtor then 
goes to its government creditors, who agree to grant relief 
according to one of several preset stock- and flow-reduction 
formulas, and obtain the debtors commitment to get 
comparability of treatment from other public and private 
creditors.61 From there, the debtor may undertake some 
combination of bond exchange and loan renegotiation with its 
foreign private creditors on terms more or less in line with those 
granted by the official sector.62 When debt to domestic creditors is 
important, it too might be restructured by contract or fiat.63 For 
the poorest countries, additional bilateral and multilateral relief 
                                            
 58. See Christoph G. Paulus, Sovereign Defaults to Be Solved by Politicians or by a Legal 
Proceeding?, 1 L. & ECON. YEARLY REV. 203, 21218 (2012) (advocating a procedural process 
for sovereign bankruptcy over the typical politics-driven approach); Krueger, International 
Financial Architecture for 2002, supra note 36, at 2, 6, 1214. 
 59. See generally RIEFFEL, supra note 32, at 1821 (describing the evolution of modern 
sovereign debt restructuring procedures through the 1990s); STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, 
supra note 32, at 1718, 22 (describing the same into the 2000s). 
 60. See RIEFFEL, supra note 32, at 7576; William Easterly, An Identity Crises? Testing 
IMF Financial Programming 911 (Ctr. for Global Dev., Working Paper No. 9, 2002), available 
at http://www.cgdev.org/files/2781_file_cgd_wp009.pdf; Lending by the IMF, INTL MONETARY 
FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/about/lending.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2013). 
 61. See RIEFFEL, supra note 32, at 7276; What Does Comparability of Treatment Mean?, 
PARIS CLUB, http://www.clubdeparis.org/sections/composition/principes/comparabilite-
traitement/53-comparabilite-de/switchLanguage/en (last visited Mar. 11, 2013). 
 62. See RIEFFEL, supra note 32, at 7278; see also STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, 
supra note 32, at 1519 (chronicling the development of debt restructuring agreements). I have 
discussed the process in Anna Gelpern, Hard, Soft, and Embedded: Implementing Principles 
on Promoting Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing 1113 (WCL Research Paper 
No. 2012-44, 2012). 
 63. See STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 32, at 21624 (describing 
Uruguays restructuring of its domestic and international debt). 
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may be available under programs established by the IMF and the 
multilateral development banks.64 Crucially, the process is 
dominated by a small group of repeat players.65 This is partly a 
function of the tiny number of sovereign governments compared 
to potentially insolvent firms and individuals, but also of the 
tight community with considerable norm-generating capacity 
that emerged out of repeated restructurings since the 1980s.66 
Even apparently novel casessuch as the Greek debt 
restructuring in the spring of 2012do not suffer from process 
unpredictability. Notwithstanding claims that the reckoning was 
delayed because officials and market participants did not know 
what to do, the precise sequence of the operation, including the 
time frame, was spelled out in a widely read white paper by an 
eminent sovereign practitioner and academic, written almost two 
years before the restructuring.67 A bankers association helped 
facilitate the restructuring using a code of conduct it had been 
promoting for years.68 Europe knew exactly what to do; it just did 
not want to do it. 
To be sure, the process is fragmented, exclusive, and 
opaqueunintelligible to the general publicserious problems to 
which I will return below. However, this is not a case of 
protagonists stalled because they do not know the dance steps. 
E. Fragmentation, Selectivity, Discrimination 
Sovereign debt is restructured in multiple fora, loosely 
linked through financing conditionality and informal 
undertakings, such as the promise of comparability.69 There is no 
way for one group of creditors to ensure that another participates 
                                            
 64. See MULTILATERAL DEBT RELIEF INITIATIVE, supra note 33, at 1. 
 65. RIEFFEL, supra note 32, at 2435. 
 66. See STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 32, at 1013. 
 67. See Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, How to Restructure Greek Debt (May 
7, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1603304; Landon Thomas Jr., An Architect of a Deal Sees 
Greece As a Model, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2012, at B1; see also Zettelmeyer, Trebesch & 
Gulati, supra note 16, at 2. 
 68. See generally, e.g., INST. OF INTL FIN., PRINCIPLES FOR STABLE CAPITAL 
FLOWS AND FAIR DEBT RESTRUCTURING IN THE EMERGING MARKETS (2005), available 
at http://www.iif.com/emp/principles/. In the wake of the Greek experience, the 
principles have been renamed: they no longer refer to the emerging markets alone. 
See INST. OF INTL FIN., REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON STRENGTHENING THE 
FRAMEWORK FOR SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION 1922 
(2012). 
 69. Hagan, supra note 34, at 32526, 334, 347; Das, Papaioannou, & Trebesch, 
supra note 9, at 1317. 
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in burden sharing and is treated equitably relative to the rest.70 
The legal regimes implicated by different categories of debt are 
very different, spanning the national laws of many foreign states, 
public international law, the charters of international 
organizations, and the domestic law of the borrower.71 Debt 
enforcement across jurisdictions adds another layer of 
complexity.72 The bargaining leverage between debtors and 
creditors also differs considerably among legal regimes.73 Partly 
for this reason, the most institutionally developed sovereign 
bankruptcy proposal in recent decadesthe IMFs Sovereign 
Debt Restructuring Mechanism, announced in late 2001 and 
shelved in early 2003covered only foreign private debt, not debt 
owed to international institutions or other governments, or debt 
governed by domestic law.74 
Some categories of debt have been excluded from 
restructuring by custom. Tradable bonds were famously among 
these in the late 1990s, along with multilateral loans, short-term 
trade credits, and domestic obligations.75 Traditionally excluded 
debts enjoy de facto senior statusuntil they do not, as 
                                            
 70. See Hagan, supra note 34, at 31617; Hugh Bronstein, Argentina Aims at 
Bond Holdouts Ahead of Court Showdown, REUTERS (Feb. 2, 2013 11:47 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/02/us-argentina-debt-
idUSBRE9110A220130202. As in the Paris Club comparability example, each group 
might try to pressure the others indirectly through the debtor, and by threatening to 
pull out and leave the financing gap open. 
 71. See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund art. 1, Dec. 27, 
1945, 2 U.N.T.S. 39, 40; Das, Papaioannou, & Trebesch, supra note 17, at 6 tbl.13; 
Panizza, Sturzenegger & Zettelmeyer, supra note 31, at 65254. 
 72. In an extreme example, a judgment issued under New York or English law 
may be enforced under the laws of Ghana, which are then trumped by a public 
international tribunal established to adjudicate disputes concerning the law of the sea. 
The ARA Libertad Case (Arg. v. Ghana), Case No. 20, Order of Dec. 15, 2012, at 18
19, available at http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.20/ 
C20_Order_15.12.2012.corr.pdf. 
 73. Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, Multilateral Negotiations for Rescheduling 
Developing Country Debt: A Bargaining-Theoretic Framework, 35 STAFF PAPERSINTL 
MONETARY FUND 644, 64547 (1988) (comparing the different levels of bargaining 
power in sovereign debt contracts versus domestic lending contracts). 
 74. INTL MONETARY FUND, THE DESIGN OF THE SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING 
MECHANISMFURTHER CONSIDERATIONS 89 (2002), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/sdrm/2002/112702.pdf; INTL MONETARY FUND, 
PROPOSED FEATURES OF A SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING MECHANISM 3, 2324 
(2003) [hereinafter INTL MONETARY FUND, PROPOSED FEATURES], available at 
http://www.imf.org/ 
external/np/pdr/sdrm/2003/021203.pdf; see also Hagan, supra note 34, at 300 & n.1, 
30102, 34748, 35052. 
 75. RIEFFEL, supra note 32, at 35, 37; Das, Papaioannou, & Trebesch, supra note 
9, at 95. 
Do Not Delete  4/9/2013 4:30 PM 
1108 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [50:4 
bondholders found out at the end of the twentieth century.76 
When debt that claims to be senior forms a large part of the debt 
stock, it is almost invariably restructured to help restore debt 
sustainability.77 
Recent European experience illustrates the problem. The 
European Central Bank (ECB) came to hold a large portion of the 
Greek debt stock as part of its early efforts to keep down the 
interest rates in debt-ridden member states.78 It refused to 
participate in the Greek debt exchange claiming that to do so 
would violate EU treaty prohibitions on monetary financing.79 
Greece, its private bankers, EU and IMF officials, and other 
participants in the process effectively acquiesced in the ECBs 
claim: Greece exchanged the bonds held by the central bank for 
ones identical in all respects but the serial numbers, then 
proceeded to exclude the new serial numbers from its 
restructuring offer.80 This ex post, ad hoc grant of seniority did 
not go without protestmost notably, Norways sovereign wealth 
fund sold off its holdings of Irish and Portuguese debt after being 
subordinated to the ECB in Greece, though it did not block the 
Greek restructuring.81 
A few short months after the Greek exchange, the ECB 
announced a new bond buying program to reduce interest rates 
and support sovereign debt markets in Europethis time 
prompted by concerns over larger economies, such as Spain and 
Italy.82 Mindful of the experience in Greece, market participants 
                                            
 76. See NOURIEL ROUBINI & BRAD SETSER, BAILOUTS OR BAIL-INS? 25156 (2004); 
Gelpern, supra note 1, at 112729. 
 77. Lee C. Buchheit, Of Creditors, Preferred and Otherwise, INTL FIN. L. REV., June 
1991, at 12, 1213. 
 78. See Decision 2010/281, of the European Central Bank of 14 May 2010 on 
Establishing a Securities Markets Programme, 2010 O.J. (L124) 8, available at 
http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/l_12420100520en00080009.pdf; Zettelmeyer, Trebesch & 
Gulati, supra note 16, at 24. 
 79. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
art. 123, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C83) 47, 99, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0047:0200:en:PDF; Opinion 
of the European Central Bank on the Establishment of the Financial Stability Fund, at 6
9, CON (2010) 54 (July 9, 2010), available at http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/ 
pdf/en_con_2010_54.pdf. 
 80. Zettelmeyer, Trebesch & Gulati, supra note 16, at 56, 25. 
 81. Richard Milne, Norway State Oil Fund Cuts Eurozone Exposure, FIN. TIMES 
WEEKEND, May 56, 2012, at 18. 
 82. Press Release, European Cent. Bank, Technical Features of Outright Monetary 
Transactions (Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2012/html/ 
pr120906_1.en.html; Mario Draghi, President of the European Cent. Bank, Introductory 
Statement to the Press Conference (with Q & A) (July 5, 2012), 
http://www.ecb.int/press/pressconf/2012/html/is120705.en.html#. 
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and others said that ECB bond buying would be a negative for 
distressed sovereigns. Instead of seeing a fresh new secondary 
market, creditors saw a giant usurper zooming to the head of the 
distribution line.83 The ECB responded by reversing its position 
and promising not to claim seniority; it even figured out how to 
square the monetary financing circle under the treaties.84 Time 
will tell whether this commitment would bring the ECB into a 
sovereign debt restructuring on par with private creditors. 
An important advantage of bankruptcy for firms and 
individuals is its capacity for comprehensive coverage and 
process centralization. It makes economic and political sense to 
collect and adjust all claims against the debtor in a single forum 
under a single set of rules, and to pay claims out of a unified set 
of assets. Comprehensive coverage and centralization make it 
more likely that relief will be effective, that all stakeholders will 
be treated equitably, and that the process will enjoy legitimacy. 
Taking claims or assets out of the bankruptcy processas in the 
swaps carve-out in the case of claims,85 or the homestead 
exemption in the case of assets86is a consequential step that 
requires serious policy justification. Comprehensive coverage and 
centralization may be harder to achieve in a sovereign 
restructuring process precisely because the applicable legal 
regimes are so diverse, and there is no readily available source of 
supranational authority to preside over the competing claims.87 
F.  Overborrowing and Dilution 
In the paper I cited at the start of this Commentary, Patrick 
Bolton and David Skeel showed that sovereigns are especially 
prone to overborrowing because they are not bound by an 
enforceable system of payment priorities.88 An overindebted 
sovereign retains access to financing long past the time it should 
                                            
 83. See Zettelmeyer, Trebesch & Gulati, supra note 16, at 3436; Mario Draghi, 
President of the European Cent. Bank, Introductory Statement to the Press Conference 
(with Q & A) (Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.ecb.int/press/pressconf/2012/html/ 
is120906.en.html (addressing concerns over the ECBs bond purchase program). 
 84. Joseph Cotterill, Seniority, the SMP, and the OMT, FTALPHAVILLE BLOG (Sept. 
6, 2012, 5:39 PM), http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2012/09/06/1148941/seniority-the-smp-and-
the-omt/; Draghi, supra note 83. 
 85. DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODDFRANK 
ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 16366 (2011). 
 86. Timothy R. Tarvin, Bankruptcy, Relocation, and the Debtors Dilemma: 
Preserving Your Homestead Exemption Versus Accepting the New Job Out of State, 43 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 141, 144 (2011). 
 87. See, e.g., Daniel K. Tarullo, Rules, Discretion, and Authority in International 
Financial Reform, 4 J. INTL ECON. L. 613, 65758 (2001). 
 88. Bolton & Skeel. supra note 1, at 78890, 792. 
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because new creditors expect to share in the resources that would 
have gone to repay the old, or might even secure a side promise of 
preferential treatment.89 The old creditors claims are effectively 
diluted because a sovereign suffering from a debt overhang does 
not improve its payment capacity with new borrowingit is 
merely accumulating more claims against the same old assets 
and revenues.90 Expecting later dilution, longer term creditors 
might charge more to lend to a solvent sovereign. In U.S. 
bankruptcy, incentives to overborrow are limited because it 
enforces statutory and contractual priorities and voids 
preferential transfers on the eve of a bankruptcy filing.91 An 
insolvent debtor has few ways of digging the hole deeper. 
The lack of enforceable priorities is clearly a problem, but 
not one that can support an argument for a full-blown 
bankruptcy regimejust for a regime in which a debtor and a 
creditor can agree on repayment priority at borrowing, and see 
the agreement enforced in distress.92 Recent proposals to reform 
the European sovereign debt markets are instructive. One of the 
most prominentthe Blue Bond/Red Bond proposalwould 
effectively create a senior category of debt (blue bonds) by 
mutualizing all member state bond obligations that, in the 
aggregate, are at or below European treaty debt thresholds.93 
Borrowing over the limit (red bonds) would cost member states 
more because repayment would be their several responsibility 
when they are, by definition, overindebted.94 
Stratification here is achieved by ex ante guarantees.95 I 
have proposed elsewhere that it be done by contract.96 A 
reasonable objection to the use of ex ante guarantees is that it 
amounts to a bailout fund with moral hazard potential.97 A 
                                            
 89. Id. at 79295. 
 90. See id. at 79091. 
 91. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 510, 547(b), 726 (2006). 
 92. But see generally William W. Bratton, Pari Passu and a Distressed Sovereigns 
Rational Choices, 53 EMORY L.J. 823 (2004) (arguing that sovereign debt contract 
interpretation produces multiple conflicting meanings for the debt ranking term, and 
even if such contract terms were enforceable, they could be indeterminate absent 
statutory bankruptcy). 
 93. Jacques Delpla & Jakob von Weizsäcker, Eurobonds: The Blue Bond Concept 
and Its Implications, BRUEGEL POLY CONTRIBUTION, Mar. 2011, at 2, 23, available at 
http://www.bruegel.org/publications/publication-detail/publication/509-eurobonds-the-
blue-bond-concept-and-its-implications/. 
 94. Id. at 25. 
 95. Id. at 2. 
 96. See Gelpern, supra note 1, at 1119. 
 97. See Bolton & Skeel, supra note 1, at 764; Delpla & von Weizsäcker, supra note 
93, at 3. I discuss moral hazard concerns later in this Commentary. See infra Part II.H.  
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powerful objection to stratification by contract is that sovereign 
commitments are unenforceable, and there is no reason to believe 
that a commitment to payment priority would fare any better 
than a commitment to payment.98 Even if one were to concede the 
enforcement point, bankruptcy has no particular advantage here. 
If anything, because it involves more elaborate commitments, it 
is more vulnerable to the same objection,99 unless enforcement is 
simply assumed from the statutory (treaty) nature of sovereign 
bankruptcy. If the enforcement problem is solved, contractual 
priorities become viable. 
G. Interim Financing 
The debtors need for interim financing during 
reorganization is often cited as a distinct argument for sovereign 
bankruptcy.100 It is probably best viewed as a subcategory of the 
priorities challenge. If a debtor were able to grant enforceable 
priority status to private creditors during reorganization, they 
should be more willing to lend. 
Sovereign debtors already get priority financing conditional 
on policy reform during the adjustment periodit comes from the 
IMF and other international institutions.101 The priority status of 
multilateral financing is occasionally questioned;102 when new 
sources materialize, they must be integrated in the existing 
customary scheme. Recent controversy surrounding the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) is instructive. 
                                            
 98. See Bolton & Skeel, supra note 1, at 793. 
 99. Gelpern, supra note 1, at 111618, 112223, 1126. 
 100. Hagan, supra note 34, at 37476; Ugo Panizza, Do We Need a Mechanism for 
Solving Sovereign Debt Crises? A Rule-Based Discussion 67 (Graduate Inst. of Intl & 
Dev. Studies, Working Paper No. 03/2013, 2013) (arguing that under current 
unstructured approaches, private creditors are discouraged from providing financing to 
sovereigns, amplifying financial crises). 
 101. See Shean Hagan, Sovereign Debtors, Private Creditors, and the IMF, 8 LAW & 
BUS. REV. AM. 49, 50 (2003); Das, Papaioannou, & Trebesch, supra note 9, at 14. 
 102. International Financial Institution (IFI) priority has been questioned as a 
normative matter. Kunibert Raffer, Preferred or Not Preferred: Thoughts on Priority 
Structures of Creditors (Oct. 16, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://homepage.univie.ac.at/kunibert.raffer/ila-wash.pdf (IFIs should not be senior); 
The International Monetary Fund in a Changed Global Environment, MONTHLY REP. 
(Deutsche Bundesbank, Ger.), Sept. 2012, at 61, 67, available at 
http://www.bundesbank.de/Redaktion/EN/Downloads/Publications/Monthly_Report_Art
icles/2012/2012_09_iwf.pdf?__blob=publicationFile (IFI priority is bad because it crowds 
out private funding). It has also been questioned as a descriptive matter. Jeremy 
Bulow, Kenneth Rogoff & Afonso S. Bevilaqua, Official Creditor Seniority and Burden-
Sharing in the Former Soviet Bloc, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, no. 1, 1992, 
at 195, 213, available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Projects/BPEA/1992%201/ 
1992a_bpea_bulow_rogoff_bevilaqua_collins_bruno.PDF (IFIs are not really senior). 
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The ESM was conceived as a regional crisis response 
framework.103 It emerged out of dissatisfaction with the ad hoc 
management of the Greek debt restructuring and its effect 
elsewhere in Europe.104 One could even think of it as a proto-
bankruptcy regimea characterization I consider in my 
conclusions. Among other things, the ESM would provide financing 
to eurozone countries in distress strictly conditional on policy 
reform.105 Treaty recitals seem to suggest that ESM has a legal 
claim to priority repayment, second in line to only the IMF.106 There 
are two problems with this assertion. First, the IMF and other 
established multilaterals, such as the World Bank, assiduously 
avoid claiming legal priority. Their so-called preferred creditor 
status is a matter of practice.107 European claims with respect to the 
ESM muddied the waters for the system as a whole. An awkward 
compromise followed: European officials backtracked on the 
seniority claim in public announcements and kept it out of the 
operative treaty provisions.108 However, uncertainty remained, and 
came back to haunt eurozone policy makers when it was proposed 
that the ESM finance Spanish bank recapitalization.109 As with ECB 
financing discussed earlier, massive confusion ensued among 
creditors as to whether they were being saved or subordinated 
thanks to ESM financing for Spanish banks.110 
                                            
 103. See generally Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism art. 3, Sept. 
27, 2012, available at http://www.european-council.europa.eu/media/582311/05-
tesm2.en12.pdf. 
 104. Deborah Zandstra, The European Sovereign Debt Crisis and Its Evolving 
Resolution, 6 CAPITAL MARKETS L.J. 285, 294, 299300 (2011); see also European Stability 
Mechanism (European Financial Stability Facility), N.Y. TIMES, 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/e/european_financial_st
ability_facility/index.html (last updated Oct. 19, 2012). 
 105. See Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, supra note 103, at 3. 
 106. See id. at 7. 
 107. Rutsel Silvestre J. Martha, Preferred Creditor Status Under International Law: 
The Case of the International Monetary Fund, 39 INTL & COMP. L.Q. 801, 80910  (1990); 
Joseph Cotterill, The Preferred, Puzzling, ESM, FTALPHAVILLE BLOG (Feb. 3, 2012, 12:10 
PM), http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2012/02/03/866181/the-preferred-esm-for-real/. 
 108. See Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, supra note 103, at 7; 
Draghi, supra note 83; Joshua Chaffin, No Special Status for Eurozone Bonds, FIN. TIMES 
(LONDON) (June 20, 2011), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5e370954-9b49-11e0-a254-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2NNVQ1QxO. 
 109. See Press Release, European Stability Mechanism, European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM) Issues Bonds for the Recapitalisation of the Spanish Banking Sector 1 (Dec. 5, 2012), 
available at http://www.esm.europa.eu/pdf/ESM%20press%20release%20ESM%20issues% 
20bonds%20for%20the%20recap%20of%20Spanish%20banks%2004122012.pdf; Spain: ESMs 
First Disbursement of Financial Assistance, EUR. STABILITY MECHANISM, 
http://www.esm.europa.eu/about/assistance/spain (last visited Mar. 3, 2013). 
 110. Joseph Cotterill, Spain Seniority, and Survivor Bias, FTALPHAVILLE BLOG (June 28, 
2012, 11:51 PM), http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2012/06/28/1058271/spain-seniority-and-survivor-
bias/. 
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The upshot of the interim financing argument is this: if 
governments and international organizations have enough 
funding to meet the entire interim financing need, the 
international financial institutions reasonably successful half 
century as preferred creditors suggests that a bankruptcy 
regime may be superfluous for now. However, as larger 
economies become insolvent, as willingness to fund international 
organizations goes down, and as new regional, multilateral, and 
private financiers enter the fray, the question of priority for such 
financing is bound to return. Even so, it remains a question of 
granting enforceable prioritynot bankruptcysubject to all the 
qualifications in the preceding section. 
H. Bailouts and Moral Hazard 
The debate over ex post third-party rescuesor bailouts
has produced an important and still-growing law literature, 
which received a big boost from the financial crisis in 2008.111 It 
joins the writing from other disciplines and earlier crises.112 
Professors Skeel and Gillette are among the leading contributors 
to this literature.113 This Commentary is not the place to reprise 
or arbitrate among the different contributions. Rather than ask 
whether bailouts are always bad or how to tell the good and the 
bad apart, I wonder whether bankruptcy necessarilyor even 
likelywould lead to fewer bailouts for sovereign states. 
This is, at bottom, the too big to fail debate: whether 
debtors whose default or restructuring would cause intolerable 
spillover effects could nevertheless be allowed to go under.114 
States, even more than banks, are nearly always too big to fail.115 
                                            
 111. See, e.g., Levitin, supra note 53, at 43738, 49092; Skeel, supra note 19, at 680, 
691, 70406. 
 112. See, e.g., STEVEN B. KAMIN, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 736, IDENTIFYING THE ROLE OF MORAL 
HAZARD IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS 18 (2002), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2002/726/ifdp736.pdf; ROUBINI & SETSER, supra 
note 77, at 119203; Cheryl D. Block, Overt and Covert Bailouts: Developing a Public 
Bailout Policy, 67 IND. L.J. 951, 95254, 96566 (1992) (considering the meaning of 
bailouts for private entities); Tarullo, supra note 87, at 61416. 
 113. SKEEL, supra note 85, at 12934; Clayton P. Gillette, Can Public Debt Enhance 
Democracy?, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 937, 97677 (2008); Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal 
Federalism, Political Will, and Strategic Use of Municipal Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 
281, 30607 (2012) [hereinafter Gillette, Fiscal Federalism]; Skeel, supra note 21, at 
107680; Skeel, supra note 19, at 70406. 
 114. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The DoddFrank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate 
Response to the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951, 98086 (2011). 
 115. But see Steven L. Schwarcz, Facing the Debt Challenge of Countries That Are 
Too Big to Fail, in SOVEREIGN DEBT: FROM SAFETY TO DEFAULT 42528 (Robert W. Kolb 
ed., 2011); cf. Levitin, supra note 53, at 44651  (defining systemic risk in political terms). 
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David Skeel has argued forcefully that bankruptcy can be a 
viable alternative to bailouts for banks and states alike.116 I 
remain convinced that in systemically important cases, public 
finance and debt restructuring will proceed side by sideas in 
the U.S. auto bailout117 and in the nascent European crisis 
management regime.118 For bankruptcy to preempt, foreclose, or 
even limit bailouts, debtors, creditors, and potential spillover 
victims would have to invoke it early, before collateral damage 
spreads. This in turn requires a high degree of political support 
for loss recognition and distribution.119 Bankruptcys advantage 
over default or ad hoc restructuring is in its prenegotiated 
distribution bargain. Whether any such bargain can hold in a 
systemic crisis is an open question. But experience in the United 
States since 2008 and Europe since 2010 inspires skepticism. 
I. Illegitimacy and Capture 
The last of the prevailing arguments for sovereign 
bankruptcy addresses the politics head on. Advanced principally 
by civil society groups, this argument is most concerned with the 
second and third debt problems of the lot I described at the start 
of this Part (debtor autonomy and debt provenance),120 but also 
with process illegitimacy. From this perspective, the debt 
restructuring process is captured by technocrats obsessed with 
efficiency, who are in turn captured by rich country politicians 
and bankers, so as to ensure that the burden of adjustment falls 
on the poor, while the rich are protected.121 Even if coordination 
problems did not exist, if interim financing were freely available, 
and if debtors restructured at the first sign of trouble, the result 
would be illegitimate because it would distribute losses to those 
least able to bear them, and would repay or adjust debts without 
regard to their provenance.122 An analogous argument has been 
                                            
Small economies, such as Grenada or Seychelles, might be among the exceptions, along with 
economies truly isolated from the rest of the world. But bankruptcy for tiny states and 
international pariahs is not the design goal. 
 116. Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, 35 J. CORP. L. 
469, 471 (2010); Skeel, supra note 19, at 689707. 
 117. See Blackman & Mukhi, supra note 15, at 47; Bill Vlasic & David E. Sanger, 
Debtholders vs. U.S. Over Chrysler Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2009, at B1. 
 118. See Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, supra note 103. 
 119. See Blackman & Mukhi, supra note 15, at 47; Vlasic & Sanger, supra note 117. 
 120. See supra text accompanying notes 2629. 
 121. See Ross P. Buckley, The Rich Borrow and the Poor Repay: The Fatal Flaw in 
International Finance, WORLD POLY J., Winter 2002, at 59, 6162. 
 122. See id. at 59; An Exit from Debt Crises: The Need for Fair and Transparent 
Arbitration of Sovereign Debt, JUBILEE USA NETWORK, http://www.jubileeusa.org/ 
ftap/ftapresources.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2013). 
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made at the opposite end of the political spectrum in the United 
States: Newt Gingrich and Jeb Bush supported state bankruptcy 
as a way of breaking the grip of public employee unions on state 
fiscal policy.123 Bankruptcy is needed to correct distribution; it is 
not at all agnostic about substantive content. 
Bankruptcy proposals advanced by global civil society groups 
from this vantage point emphasize process transparency and 
stakeholder inclusion, including audits and dispute resolution 
fora, such as the Fair and Transparent Arbitration Process 
(FTAP) supported by the Jubilee Coalition. 
Some scholars and practitioners have suggested that greater 
legitimacy may be achieved by adapting common law doctrines of 
fraud and duress, as well as principles of agency law, without 
recourse to bankruptcy.124 Lending and restructuring institutions, 
formal and informal, have responded to criticism from 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) by improving 
transparency and having regular civil society consultations.125 
Even so, it is hard to argue with the basic proposition: a process 
that has such a profound impact on national, cross-border, and 
intergenerational resource distribution126 should be robustly 
politically accountable; common law victories and website 
disclosure are not enough. 
But the unlikely common ground between the Jubilee 
Coalition and Newt Gingrich points to a different question: how 
might one design a sovereign bankruptcy regime that is captured 
by the right, not the wrong, peopleor one that is politically 
accountable across the political spectrum? For example, Chapter 
9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, which governs municipal 
bankruptcy and serves as a model for some of the most 
progressive sovereign bankruptcy proposals, enables holders of 
revenue bonds to collect from post-petition receivables 
unavailable to creditors of a corporation in Chapter 11 
reorganization, and fails to give priority for pension and labor 
                                            
 123. Jeb Bush & Newt Gingrich, Op-Ed., Better Off Bankrupt, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27, 
2011, at A19. 
 124. See Lee C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati, & Robert B. Thompson, The Dilemma of 
Odious Debts, 56 DUKE L.J. 1201, 123445 (2007). 
 125. See, e.g., The World Bank and Civil Society, WORLD BANK, 
http://go.worldbank.org/PWRRFJ2QH0 (last visited Feb. 9, 2013); PARIS CLUB, 
http://www.clubdeparis.org (last visited Mar. 3, 2013); see also PARIS CLUB, ANNUAL 
REPORT 2008, at 2, 1718, available at http://www.clubdeparis.org/sections/ 
communication/rapport-annuel-d/annual-report-2008/downloadFile/file/ 
AnnualReport2008.pdf (calling for increased transparency). To be sure, these 
improvements are relative, and insufficient in the eyes of the critics. 
 126. See Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 18, at 6970. 
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obligations as readily as corporate bankruptcy does.127 It is a sign 
of bankruptcys capture by capital at the expense of labor. If 
both bankruptcy and informal restructuring are arguably prone 
to capture, what makes bankruptcy the superior option? 
* * * 
This Part of my Commentary summarized the prevailing 
arguments for sovereign bankruptcy. Together, they expose 
serious shortcomings in the existing sovereign debt restructuring 
process. However, they also stop short of demonstrating that any 
existing institutional iteration of bankruptcy or bankruptcy 
proposal would offer a better path. In most cases, sovereign 
bankruptcy proposals assume away, but fail to solve, the biggest 
challenges to the existing process. The next Part is an effort to 
reframe the challenge of sovereign debt restructuring in search of 
a different argument for bankruptcy. 
III. CORE PROBLEMS AND BANKRUPTCY IMPLICATIONS 
A. Unenforceable Debt 
Since the mid-twentieth century, it has been relatively easy 
to sue sovereigns that issue debt under foreign law in foreign 
courts.128 However, enforcing judgments is virtually impossible 
because there are few assets outside a debtors borders available 
for attachment.129 The past decade of battles between Argentina 
and its creditors illustrates this problem.130 The European debt 
                                            
 127. See, e.g., JAMES E. SPIOTTO, ANN E. ACKER & LAURA E. APPLEBY, 
MUNICIPALITIES IN DISTRESS?: HOW STATES AND INVESTORS DEAL WITH LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL EMERGENCIES 4764 (2012) (discussing bondholder remedies 
with respect to revenue bonds, application of bankruptcy preferences, and comparison 
with pension obligations); James E. Spiotto, Remarks at the Field Hearing on the State of 
the Municipal Securities Market Distressed Communities 24 (July 29, 2011), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/municipalsecurities/statements072911/spiotto.pdf. 
 128. See Weidemaier, supra note 43, at 1318; Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting 
Legal Adviser, Dept of State, to Philip B. Perlman, Acting Attorney Gen. (May 19, 
1952), reprinted in 26 THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 984, 98485 (1952). It 
was later codified in the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1605 (2006); U.K. State Immunity Act of 1978, c. 1, § 3(1); Singapore State 
Immunity Act of 1979, c. 313, § 5; South African Foreign States Immunity Act 87 of 
1981 § 4; Canadian State Immunity Act of 1982, R.S.C., 1985, c. S-18, among others. 
See Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 613 (1992) (discussing the 
emergence of restrictive immunity for foreign governments in U.S. courts since the 
Tate Letter in 1952); PHILIP WOOD, 2 LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 
§ 4.02(1), (3) (2008). 
 129. See Blackman & Mukhi, supra note 15, at 59; Weidamaier, supra note 43, at 
18. 
 130. See Seijas v. Republic of Argentina, 606 F.3d 53, 5558 (2d Cir. 2010); Ross 
P. Buckley, Why Are Developing Nations So Slow to Play the Default Card in 
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crisis has brought attention to the fact that most of the worlds 
sovereign debt is issued under the law of the sovereign itself, 
giving the debtor more leverage over the terms of its debt 
restructuring.131 
At first blush, robust asset immunity seems to have helped 
mitigate many of the collective action problems that motivate 
business and personal bankruptcy.132 On closer inspection, 
immunity appears an increasingly fragile patchwork of national 
and international norms.133 While it may still dissuade mass 
litigationchasing sovereign assets around the globe requires 
vast resources and patienceit leads to unpredictable 
enforcement strategies and makes bad law. For example, a tiny 
fraction of Argentinas creditors that rejected restructuring offers 
after the 2001 default has tried to nab payments to other 
creditors in New York,134 diplomatic property in Maryland,135 a 
presidential airplane in Germany,136 and a military ship in 
Ghana.137 Although creditors recovery has been meager to date, 
over the past few years, they have secured breakthrough rulings 
in Belgium, France, Ghana, Hong Kong, and the United States
taking advantage of subtle differences in commercial and 
immunity laws among jurisdictions.138 The October 2012 ruling 
from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which 
                                            
Renegotiating Their Sovereign Indebtedness?, 6 CHI. J. INTL L. 345, 352 (2005); 
Arturo C. Porzecanski, From Rogue Creditors to Rogue Debtors: Implications of 
Argentinas Default, 6 CHI. J. INTL L. 311, 32627 (2005). 
 131. U.N. Assistant Secretary-General of the Department of Economic Affairs, 
Remarks on the Special Event of the Second Committee on Sovereign Debt 
Restructurings: Lessons Learnt and Proposals for Debt Resolution Mechanisms (Oct. 25, 
2012), http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/asg/statements/asg-2012-event-on-
sovereign-debt.shtml. 
 132. See Skeel, supra note 19, at 68586. 
 133. See Blackman & Mukhi, supra note 15, at 4849. 
 134. See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 25761 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 135. The End of the Affair?, ECONOMIST (Feb. 20, 2004), http://www.economist.com/ 
node/2440367. 
 136. Agustino Fontevecchia, The Real Story of How a Hedge Fund Detained a Vessel 
in Ghana and Even Went for Argentinas Air Force One, FORBES (Oct. 5, 2012, 6:50 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/2012/10/05/the-real-story-behind-the-argentine-
vessel-in-ghana-and-how-hedge-funds-tried-to-seize-the-presidential-plane/. 
 137. The ARA Libertad Case (Arg. v. Ghana), Case No. 20, Order of Dec. 15, 2012, 
available at 
http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.20/C20_Order_15.12.2012.co
rr.pdf; Ghana Told to Free Argentine Ship Libertad by UN Court, BBC NEWS (Dec. 15, 
2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-20743016. 
 138. See NML Capital, Ltd., 699 F.3d at 25761; Mark L. J. Wright, Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring: Problems and Prospects, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 156, 158 (2012); Hold-Outs 
Upheld, ECONOMIST (Nov. 3, 2012), http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-
economics/21565635-court-ruling-against-argentina-has-implications-other-governments-hold-
outs. 
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allows holders of defaulted bonds to block payments on 
performing debt, may be the last straw for immunity from 
enforcement, though it is too early to know for sure.139 
The result is shaping up to be a paradox: on the one hand, 
Argentina appears to have walked away from billions of dollars 
worth of admittedly legal, valid, and binding debt contracts with 
impunity.140 A decade on, holdouts have been paid a tiny fraction 
of what they are owed141not an attractive business model so far. 
On the other hand, Argentina is harassed at every turn, with 
increasingly odd theories of contract interpretation and sovereign 
immunity reshaping the legal landscapeas collateral damage 
grows. 
The Greek debt restructuring taught a different lesson. 
Because over 90% of Greeces private debt stock was governed 
by Greek law, Greece restructured it with the help of a 
domestic statute that unilaterally and retroactively grafted a 
majority amendment mechanism across Greek bonds, using 
voting thresholds exceedingly favorable to the debtor.142 On the 
one hand, it was generous of Greece to let bondholders vote at 
allit could have simply reduced the debt by fiat, or imposed a 
70% withholding tax on bond payments.143 Moreover, Greece 
made an elaborate effort to negotiate with its creditors and it 
deployed retroactive legislation as a last resort, with the 
apparent knowledge of those who planned to participate.144 
Nevertheless, the import of the unilateral retroactive statute 
was not lost on the creditor community, a portion of which 
complained of lawlessness and compared Greece to 
Argentina.145 
                                            
 139. See NML Capital, Ltd., 699 F.3d at 260; Felix Salmon, Argentinas Stunning 
Pari Passu Loss, REUTERS ANALYSIS & OPINION (Oct. 27, 2012), 
http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2012/10/27/argentinas-stunning-pari-passu-loss/. 
 140. See Porzecanski, supra note 130, at 317. 
 141. J.F. HORNBECK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41029, ARGENTINAS DEFAULTED 
SOVEREIGN DEBT: DEALING WITH THE HOLDOUTS 3, 7 (2010). 
 142. Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 18; Zettelmeyer, Trebesch & Gulati, supra note 
16, at 7, 2528. 
 143. See Zettelmeyer, Trebesch & Gulati, supra note 16, at 7. 
 144. See id. 
 145. See Katy Burne & Matina Stevis, Greek Legal Maneuvers Raise Fears of Euro-
Zone Debt Fallout, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 23, 2012, 4:43 AM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/eurocrisis/2012/02/23/greek-legal-maneuvers-raise-fears-of-euro-zone-
debt-fallout/ (forecasting that adding retroactive collective-action clauses to Greek bond 
contracts would almost certainly be deemed an act of coercion); Patrick Collinson, 
Eurozone Crisis: How Grim Would Bankruptcy Be for Greece?, OBSERVER (Nov. 5, 2011), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/nov/06/euro-crisis-greece-bankruptcy-argentina 
(opining that, in light of the Greek debt crisis, the parallels between Athens and Buenos 
Aires are ominous). 
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In sum, the immunity shield is just barely good enough to 
preempt demand for bankruptcy protections on the part of the 
debtors and a majority of creditors who seek a quick and 
orderly restructuring. On the other hand, Argentina and 
Greece are bad news for creditors that seek predictable 
recoveries. This suggests that there may be room for an old-
time bankruptcy bargain, in which the debtor hands over 
property to the creditors as a group in exchange for discharge 
and protection from harassment by individual creditors.146 I 
return to the potential shape of such a bargain at the end of 
this Part.147 
B. Nondischargeable Debt 
Sovereign debt is forever: it cannot be discharged without 
creditors consent. Debtors might simply walk away, subject to the 
constraints described in the preceding section. Contractual 
techniquessuch as majority amendment provisions, especially 
ones that permit aggregated voting across bond series and other 
debt instrumentscan help overcome holdout.148 However, 
majority amendment provisions without more appear to make 
little difference in the restructuring outcome, while aggregation 
provisions are extremely rare.149 When they exist, such provisions 
operate across bond series, never across different kinds of debt.150 
As a result, the idea of a truly fresh start is essentially 
inconceivable for a sovereign. Even when most creditors agree to 
go along with a restructuring, it is virtually guaranteed that there 
will remain some debt somewhere that could come back to 
piggyback on other creditors concessions.151 By that point, the 
debtor may be in a position to settle such debt on the side. At a 
minimum, this scenario raises concerns with intercreditor equity 
and incentives for future restructuring. 
                                            
 146. Cf. Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United 
States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 2325 (1995). 
 147. See infra Part III.E. 
 148. Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will, 51 
EMORY L.J. 1317, 132122 (2002); Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, Public Symbol in Private 
Contract: A Case Study, 84 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1627, 1707 (2006). 
 149. Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 148, at 1706. 
 150. Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, The Evolution of Contractual 
Terms in Sovereign Bonds, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 139, 141 (2012). 
 151. Jeffrey D. Sachs, Resolving the Debt Crisis of Low-Income Countries, BROOKINGS 
PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, no. 1, 2002, at 257, 260. 
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C. Debt Fragmentation 
The biggest creditor coordination problem in sovereign debt 
occurs not within, but among different creditor groups, such as 
official and private, domestic and foreign, and bilateral and 
multilateral creditors.152 The fight for repayment priority in 
distress has only recently started to make headlines, but has long 
been among the dominant drivers of uncertainty and delay in 
restructuring.153 Greece did not wait for two years to restructure 
because its bondholders failed to agree on a haircut or rushed to 
the courthouse, but rather because its bondholders, EU officials, 
the IMF, and the ECB could not agree on allocating losses among 
taxpayers in Greece, in Europe, and elsewhere around the 
world.154 
A related concern already mentioned in Part II is that the 
well-oiled sovereign restructuring process is utterly unintelligible 
to the public.155 Because different debt categories are restructured 
in different and formally unconnected fora, under different rules, 
with different avenues for dispute resolution, it is difficult to 
impossible for the people affected by the outcomebe it debtor 
country taxpayers or pensioners whose funds invested in the 
debtto get a comprehensive view of the process or to be heard 
in a meaningful way.156 This detracts from the overall legitimacy 
of the restructuring regime, to which I turn next. 
D. Authority and Legitimacy 
At the start of Part II, I mentioned three arguments for 
sovereign debt restructuring: efficiency (framed as debt 
sustainability), autonomy (Jubilee), and legitimacy (Odious 
Debt).157 Sustainability is the first and most successful of the 
                                            
 152. Patrick Bolton & Olivier Jeanne, Structuring and Restructuring Sovereign Debt: 
The Role of Seniority 78 (Natl Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11071, 
2005) (noting the ways in which different classes of creditors receive different treatment 
during debt restructurings). 
 153. ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 76, at 24987. 
 154. See Dina Kyriakidou & Lesley Wroughton, IMF, EU Clash Over Greeces Bailout 
Prospects, REUTERS (Sept. 26, 2012, 9:59 AM), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2012/09/26/us-greece-bailout-lenders-idUSBRE88P0WI20120926 (describing the 
tension between Greece, IMF, EU and ECB in developing a plan for Greeces debt 
restructuring). 
 155. See supra Part II.D. 
 156. See Steven L Schwarcz, Idiots Guide to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 
EMORY L.J. 1189, 118990 (2004); Das, Papaioannou & Trebesch, supra note 9, at 1213 
(describing the steps, actors, and various processes involved in sovereign debt 
restructuring). 
 157. See supra Part II.A. 
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three.158 The level of debt sustainability is currently determined 
by the IMF; however, the IMF analysis has been the target of 
vigorous criticism for lack of transparency and political 
capture.159 The widely held perception among market participants 
and civil society observers alike is that IMF sustainability 
calculations are driven by political expediency, not the scientific 
method.160 While this characterization is not entirely fair, it 
illustrates the legitimacy dilemma in sovereign debt 
restructuring.161 When the IMF designs the reform program, 
provides interim financing, and determines the near-term 
financing need and the path to sustainability, its determinations 
become inevitably linked to its own position as a creditor, and its 
longstanding legitimacy challenges.162 While the institution 
remains indispensable, its governance is flawed, still reflecting 
too much of the post-World War II institutional consensus 
despite several promising rounds of reform.163 With creditors and 
NGOs convinced that the IMF is hopelessly conflicted as a senior 
creditor with privileged policy access, and with civil society 
observers also convinced that the IMF is forever captured by 
capital, the IMFs expert assessments, and the restructuring 
process that depends on them, are substantially diminished for 
lack of trust.164 
In practice, determinations of autonomy and legitimacy are 
either self-judging, as in the case of Ecuador,165 or subsumed in 
the sustainability conversation, as in the case of Iraq.166 
Proposals to link up this inquiry with the U.N. sanctions 
                                            
 158. See Krugman, supra note 23, at 25456. 
 159. See Hector R. Torres, Reforming the International Monetary FundWhy Its 
Legitimacy Is at Stake, 10 J. INTL ECON. L. 443, 44750 (2007); Charles Wyplosz, Debt 
Sustainability Assessment: The IMF Approach and Alternatives 23, 1214 (Graduate 
Inst. for Intl Studies, Working Paper No. 03/2007, 2007), available at 
http://repository.graduateinstitute.ch/record/11765/files/HEIWP03-2007.pdf. 
 160. See Torres, supra note 159, at 455. 
 161. Id. at 44445. 
 162. See id. 
 163. See Douglas Rediker, Losing at the IMF, FOREIGN POLY (Oct. 10, 2012), 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/10/losing_at_the_imf; Edwin M. Truman, 
The G-20 Is Failing, FOREIGN POLY (Apr. 12, 2012), 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/12/the_g_20_is_failing. 
 164. See Torres, supra note 159, at 455; 460 (describing the IMFs selective 
prioritization of financial liabilities). 
 165. See Noteholder Circular, supra note 28, at iii; Arturo C. Porzecanski, When Bad 
Things Happen to Good Sovereign Debt Contracts: The Case of Ecuador, LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Fall 2010, at 251, 26566. 
 166. Interview by Euromoney with Adil Abdul Mahdi, Minister of Fin. in the Interim 
Govt of Iraq, in Dubai, U.A.E. (2003), in Felix Salmon, Seeking Forgiveness of Saddam-
Era Debt, EUROMONEY, Sept. 2004, at 72, 76. 
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regime, or to set up stand-alone tribunals for such 
determinations, have failed to take hold so far.167 To the extent 
the restructured debt stock remains subject to charges of 
illegitimacy and the potential for repudiation on odiousness 
grounds, the status quo is problematic for debtors and 
creditors alike. 
E. Bankruptcy Implications 
The existing regime for contracting and restructuring 
sovereign debt is deeply flawed. The debt itself is 
unenforceable yet nondischargeable.168 The process for its 
restructuring is fragmented, its coverage is selective, and it 
lacks an accountable mechanism to verify claims and establish 
the necessary level of relief.169 The most direct response to 
these flaws is a regime that allows creditors as a group to 
collect from debtor assets in exchange for the promise of a 
fresh start. 
The tradeoff might include more secured lending, on the 
model of municipal revenue bonds or the U.S. oil-backed 
financing for Mexico in 1995.170 Sovereigns could find the 
bargain more attractive if it were combined with better 
protections for other propertysuch as military ships and 
presidential airplanes, financial flows to third parties, and 
payment and clearing systemsand the availability of 
discharge. 
The resulting regime must combine comprehensive 
coverage with an advance agreement on payment priorities 
among diverse groups of claimants. The content of any 
comprehensive priority scheme must be politically determined 
and enforceable: only a political process can credibly balance 
the demands of bondholders, pensioners, trade creditors, and 
other governments. A violation of priorities would come at the 
cost of discharge, much as it might in non-sovereign 
bankruptcy.171 An enforceable priority scheme that enjoys 
broad-based political support should help create incentives to 
restructure earlier, force more disclosure at borrowing, and 
                                            
 167. See Adam Feibelman, Contract, Priority, and Odious Debt, 85 N.C. L. REV. 727, 
74445 (2007). 
 168. See id. at 741. 
 169. See supra Part III.AD. 
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CHOICES FROM WALL STREET TO WASHINGTON 35, 1011, 14 (2004); Adam J. Levitin, 
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 171. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 523, 727(a)(6), 1141(d)(3) (2006). 
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establish the terms of bargaining among creditor groups in 
distress. This in turn could affect the sources and availability 
of interim financing and the terms of the reform and recovery 
program. 
Finally, the regime must incorporate a claims verification 
processor at least a process for assessing challenges to the 
legitimacy of claimsas well as an expert determination of 
debt sustainability that is publicly accepted as independent of 
the interests of would-be bailout providers. 
Establishing a restructuring regime along these lines is a 
daunting political challenge. In fact, it may well be a pipe 
dream. No matter. I started this Commentary by renouncing 
any aspiration to pragmatism. Even so, there remains the 
question: would a restructuring regime that stops short of the 
grand political bargain I have outlined be an improvement 
over the status quo? 
The answer must be, It depends. A mechanism along the 
lines proposed by the IMF in 2001172 would facilitate private 
creditor coordination and effectively serve as a super-
aggregation mechanism more powerful than Greeces 
statutory intervention.173 It would be useful, but not 
essentialand probably not worth the political and 
institutional costunless recent developments in Argentinas 
litigation produce a generalizable model for overcoming 
sovereign immunity. If the Second Circuit decision holds up 
and is interpreted to give holdouts the capacity to block 
payments on restructured debt, coordination problems might 
be expected to rise.174 Absent a rise in coordination problems, 
the value of a mechanism modeled on the IMF proposal is 
uncertain. 
The FTAP championed by the Jubilee Coalition is inspired 
by elements of the U.S. municipal bankruptcy regime, 
particularly its capacity to give voice to a wide range of 
municipal constituents.175 FTAP and similar proposals focus on 
dispute resolution, rather than creditor coordination per se, and 
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come in two basic varieties: ad hoc and standing. The proposals 
for an ad hoc tribunal focus on procedural matters, such as the 
composition of the tribunal, insist on comprehensive debt 
coverage, and import much of the substance from international 
human rights law.176 Parallel proposals for a standing arbitration 
tribunal are similar in their procedural focus and potentially 
comprehensive debt coverage.177 Matters within the tribunals 
jurisdiction might range from claim verification and voting 
disputes to all manner of substantive determinations, including 
sustainability, odiousness, and good faith.178 Whereas the ad hoc 
tribunal proposals seem driven by the ideal of inclusion and 
human rights principles, the standing tribunal is meant to seed a 
larger regime whose substantive content would reflect the 
evolving political consensus and market practice.179 Either 
proposal could be adapted to work within a broader restructuring 
regime, but neither makes for a regime on its own.180 
In sum, a sovereign bankruptcy regime would be a big 
political project. Some elements, such as overcoming coordination 
problems within creditor groups or independent dispute 
resolution, might be adapted to address isolated problems with 
restructuring. It is unclear whether the problems they would 
solve warrant institutional change on the proposed scale. More 
importantly, any statutory debt restructuring regime must be 
embedded in the broader democratic process. 
IV. CONCLUSION: THE FEDERALISM OVERLAY 
Most of this Commentary has been about sovereign 
bankruptcywhich I support in general, even as I have 
trouble envisioning it in particular. Subsovereigns and quasi-
sovereign states present some of the same challenges, notably 
immunity, but also different ones. Fiscal federalism is the 
most important of these. For example, as both Professors Skeel 
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and Gillette have pointed out, fiscal federalism presents a 
special moral hazard challenge: the spillover effects from state 
financial distress can prompt the federal government to 
intervene with a bailout for the sake of the other states or the 
federation as a whole.181 As David Skeel and those he cites 
suggest, the fiscal bargain can look dramatically different from 
one federation to the next, and it can change over time.182 In 
some arrangements, bailouts are unnecessary in crisis because 
cross-subsidies are baked in throughout; in others, bailouts 
might be more frequent only because cross-subsidies are 
minimal in ordinary times. 
The United States and Europe both offer interesting 
examples. The assumption and restructuring of state debt by 
the federal government in the aftermath of the American 
Revolution was akin to a modern bailout with strings.183 It 
played an important role in cementing the Union and creating 
foundations for a currency and a national banking system.184 
The federal governments willingness to let states default in 
the nineteenth century, and its willingness to assume 
increasing responsibility for counter-cyclical expenditures in 
the wake of the Great Depression, show the wide range of 
distribution possibilities within a single system over time.185 
Against this ever-changing background, it is hard to say 
that federal bailouts are an unqualified good or bad, or that 
bankruptcys dominant goal should be to make bailouts scant. 
Some rescues and debt assumptions are better done and better 
justified than others. 
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Depending on how it comes out at the end, Europe appears 
to be in the early stages of negotiating or renegotiating its 
federal bargain. The previous version of the bargainthe one 
with the Stability and Growth Pact and the no-bailout clause 
in EU treaties186has failed. The new one ties promises of 
fiscal fortitude, via the fiscal compact, to some combination of 
a rescue fund, a banking union, and contract reform that seeks 
to facilitate restructuring.187 Lurking in the background are 
fundamental arguments over distribution by way of regional 
deposit insurance and debt mutualization.188 The result may be 
vertical federalism, horizontal federalism, or no federalism at 
all.189 However, Europes federalism negotiation has proceeded 
through successive treaty amendments, and existing European 
instruments and pronouncements (notably the ESM treaty) 
have already done more to formalize sovereign debt 
restructuring norms than any other in the modern history of 
sovereign debt.190 Europes evolving fiscal constitution has 
been very explicit about debt restructuring.191 If the European 
project were to succeed, I would not be surprised to see proto-
bankruptcy features emerging as a core part of the federal 
bargain, even if it stops short of a full-blown debt 
restructuring mechanism, as is likely. 
I would feel comfortable with such an outcome in Europe 
because I agree with David Skeels key argument: The 
conversation about sovereign bankruptcy is at heart a 
conversation about federalism and democracy. It is healthy to 
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argue, as we have, about the wisdom of framing this 
conversation in bankruptcy terms; however, there is no 
question that debt and debt restructuring belong at the 
forefront of national, regional, and global governance debates. 
